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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW LECTURE
SERIES*
POLITICAL BATTLES FOR JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE
William H. Rehnquist**
Most of us who are familiar with our constitutional system of gov-
ernment would agree that one of the touchstones of that system is ju-
dicial independence. I like to think that belief in the wisdom of an
independent judiciary is not confined to judges alone, but is shared by
other members of the legal profession and by the public at large. Be
that as it may, it is surely a fact of political life in this nation that the
federal judiciary comprises a separate branch of the national govern-
ment, independent of the executive and legislative branches.
Yet, more than one observer of our national government has noted
the paradox, at least on the surface, which exists when the independ-
ence of the judiciary is coupled with the doctrine of judicial review
espoused by John Marshall in the celebrated case, Marbury v. Mad-
ison.1 If judges, who themselves have life tenure, may nullify a law
enacted by the popularly elected branches of the federal government,
can it truly be said that we have rule by the majority and that govern-
ment is ultimately responsive to public opinion? In the words of
Robert H. Jackson, writing shortly before he began his distinguished
career on the Supreme Court:2
The seeds of a struggle for power were planted in the Constitution
itself. That instrument set up a legislative and an executive branch.
*The Washington Law Review Lecture Series, now in its second year, is designed
to bring outstanding speakers to the law school to discuss contemporary legal issues.
The Review gratefully acknowledges the generous financial assistance provided by the
Evans Bunker Memorial Fund.
**Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court; B.A., 1948, Stanford Univer-
sity; M.A., 1949, Harvard University; LL.B., 195 1, Stanford University.
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2. R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY at viii (1941) [hereinafter
cited as JACKSON].
835
Washington Law Review
each in a large degree representative of popular will. It created on the
other hand an appointive Court, whose Justices are chosen for life,
and thus set up an overriding legal authority completely independent
of popular will. These differently constituted institutions characteris-
tically respond to the interests of different factions of society, as the
founders foresaw they would. A struggle for power between these
"equal" branches was inevitable.
While the Founders undoubtedly intended to create an independent
judiciary, and while they likewise undoubtedly foresaw that there
would be tension between the judicial and the other branches of the
federal government, in their wisdom they made no attempt to do more
than sketch in the broadest outline the attributes of the judicial
branch. 3
There is a tendency among present and former law students to
think that the development of the nature and extent of the authority of
the federal judiciary, and of the Supreme Court of the United States in
particular, may be found in the celebrated cases decided by that
Court. To an extent this is undoubtedly true. However, at least two
major political struggles in this nation have had as much to do with
defining the nature of the judicial power in the federal system as any
but a handful of the major decisions of the Supreme Court. No re-
ported judicial decision of these political struggles exists, because each
was conducted in its entirety within or between the other branches of
the federal government.
Yet, both struggles are nonetheless precedents in the unwritten con-
stitutional law dealing with Article III of the United States Constitu-
tion and the power of the federal courts. These events are first, the
impeachment of Justice Samuel Chase by the House of Representa-
tives and his subsequent acquittal by the Senate in the first decade of
the 19th century; and, second, the proposal by President Franklin
Roosevelt referred to by its supporters as the "Court Reorganization
Plan" and by its opponents as the "Court Packing Plan."
I. THE IMPEACHMENT OF JUSTICE CHASE
Samuel Chase was a Maryland man, and a signer of the Declara-
tion of Independence. He was appointed to the Supreme Court in
3. See I C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 7 (1947)
[hereinafter cited as WARREN].
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1796 by George Washington. Not unlike many Associate Justices who
served in the early days of the Court, he is not known for any major
contributions to our jurisprudence. Indeed, the only reason his name
is known to any but legal or political historians is that his political
partisanship while a judge so outraged the followers of Thomas Jef-
ferson that they sought to remove him from office by the process of
impeachment.
Samuel Chase was unable to abandon partisan political activity
when he donned the judicial robe. The commencement of the Su-
preme Court Term beginning in August 1800 was delayed in part
because Justice Chase was speaking to political gatherings in Mary-
land on behalf of John Adams' candidacy for President.4 During the
same year, Chase presided as Circuit Judge in Richmond, Virginia, at
the trial of James Callender who was charged with publishing a pam-
phlet criticizing the Adams Administration in a manner prohibited by
the Sedition Act of 1798. 5 He likewise presided at the trial of John
Fries in the same year for treason.6 In both cases the evidence we have
indicates that he conducted himself on the bench in the manner of a
"hanging judge."7 Erroneous rulings and biased conduct of the pres-
iding judge at the trial of a criminal defendant in these times was far
more devastating to the defendant than it would be now, since appel-
late review of criminal convictions was not provided in the federal
system until the latter part of the 19th century. 8
When the Federalists were ousted from national office by the elec-
tion of Thomas Jefferson in 1800, storm signals began to appear
4. Id. at 156.
5. 1 Stat. 596. Sedition trials were carried on during much of the election year of
1800, although disagreement over enforcement of the Sedition Act divided the nation.
Callender had written and published a book, Prospect Before Us, allegedly containing
criminally libelous statements against President John Adams. "Actually the particular
comments of Callender about Adams which led to his trial and conviction could have
been matched in the writings of Peter Porcupine [a Federalist] and others, not to speak
of a letter Alexander Hamilton was to write 'ere long." 3 D. MALONE, JEFFERSON AND
His TIME 471 (1970) [hereinafter cited as MALONE].
6. Justice Chase's conduct of the Fries trial resulted in the resignation of defense
counsel. Fries refused further legal assistance, was convicted of treason and sentenced
to death. Upon review of the trial proceedings, Federalist President John Adams was
moved to pardon Fries. See R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
230 (1973) [hereinafter cited as BERGER].
7. Corwin, Samuel Chase, in DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 34, 36 (1930),
cited in BERGER, supra note 6, at 229. For expanded treatment of the flagrant
breaches of judicial etiquette which characterized Justice Chase's behavior during the
Fries and Callender trials, see id. 232.
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970).
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which foreshadowed a confrontation between the legislative and exec-
utive branches (controlled by Jefferson and the Republicans), and the
judicial branch (which consisted almost entirely of Federalist ap-
pointees of Presidents Washington and Adams). Jefferson, in a private
letter written late in 1801, described his Federalist opponents in these
words: 9
On their part, they have retired into the judiciary as a stronghold.
There the remains of federalism are to be preserved and fed from the
treasury, and from that battery all the works of republicanism are to
be beaten down and erased.
There had been no suggestion, however, that any proceedings
would be brought against Justice Chase until he gave a particularly
opinionated charge to the grand jury in Baltimore in May 1803.10 In
this charge, he admittedly attacked the new state constitution of Mary-
land and its principle of universal male suffrage, saying that it would
"certainly and rapidly destroy all protection to property and all secu-
rity to personal liberty, and our republican Constitution will sink into
a mobocracy."' It was claimed, but denied by Chase, that in the
same charge he had also stated that "the present Administration is
weak, relaxed, and not adequate to a discharge of their functions, and
their acts flow, not from a wish for the happiness of the people, but
for a continuance in unfairly acquired power. '12
Shortly afterwards, President Jefferson wrote to one of his leaders
in the House of Representatives: 13
You must have heard of the extraordinary charge of Chace [sic] to the
Grand Jury of Baltimore. Ought this seditious and official attack on
the principles of our Constitution, and on the proceedings of a State,
to go unpunished? And to whom so pointedly as yourself will the
public look for the necessary measures? I ask these questions for your
consideration. For myself, it is better that I should not interfere.
9. 4 MALONE. supra note 5, at 458.
10. Justice Chase also challenged the abolition of circuit judgeships by the Act of
1802, which repealed the Judiciary Act of 1801, in stating that the "independence of
the National Judiciary is shaken to its foundation." WARREN, supra note 3, at 276. His
use of the grand jury session as a forum for partisan political speeches was not un-
common, however. BERGER, supra note 6, at 225.
I. WARREN, supra note 3. at 276.
12. Id.
13. 4 MALONE, supra note 5. at 467.
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In typical Jeffersonian fashion, the President had set matters in mo-
tion, but thereafter remained virtually silent. The House of Represent-
atives voted to present Articles of Impeachment against Samuel Chase
in the following year, 1804. Of the seven Articles, the two principal
charges were based on his conduct as the presiding judge in the Cal-
lender trial and his charge to the grand jury in Baltimore. In response
to these charges, Chase's defenders did not contend he was a good
judge or that he had conducted himself properly; they took the posi-
tion that whatever excesses he may have engaged in were not such as
to warrant impeachment. 14
The trial in the Senate began in earnest in the early part of Feb-
ruary 1805. The presiding officer was Aaron Burr, Vice President of
the United States, who had the preceding year killed Alexander Ham-
ilton in a duel. 15 Chase appeared before the Senate accompanied by
five counsel, led by Luther Martin of Maryland who was described in
the partisan invective of those days by the opposition press as that
"impudent Federalist bull dog."'16 Nearly a month was occupied in the
presentation of evidence, and one of the witnesses was Chief Justice
John Marshall. Since there were 25 Republicans and 9 Federalists in
the Senate at this time, it was clear that if the Senate voted strictly on
party lines, the Republicans could obtain the 23 votes required for the
two-thirds majority necessary to convict. 17
On March 1, 1805, after the close of the evidence and final argu-
ments, the Senate deliberated for approximately two hours and found
Chase not guilty by an absolute majority on five of the Articles. On
the principal Article in connection with the Callender trial, 18 Sena-
tors voted to find him guilty, and 16 not guilty. On the eighth Article,
based on the charge to the grand jury in Baltimore, 19 Senators voted
to find him guilty and 15 not guilty. Samuel Chase thus stood ac-
quitted of all the Articles of Impeachment brought against him.' 8
The overwhelming verdict of history has been that although Justice
Chase was intemperate in his language both on and off the bench,
14. 14 ANNALS OF CONG. 357 (1805).
15. These circumstances prompted a contemporary wag to remark that while once
"it was the practice in Courts of Justice to arraign the murderer before the Judge, [we]
now. . . behold the Judge arraigned before the murderer." 4 MALONE, Supra note 5, at
476.
16. 14 ANNALS OF CONG. 669 (1805).
17. 4 MALONE, supra note 5, at 479.
18. 14 ANNALS OF CONG. 669 (1805).
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partial to the government in the Callender trail and unrestrained in his
partisan political harangues after becoming a judge, the Senate was
right to acquit him. 19 Professor Raoul Berger in his recent book on
impeachment2 0 has weighed in on the other side of the controversy,
and takes the position that Chase should have been convicted by the
Senate for his conduct as a "hanging judge" in the Callender trial. 21
The merits of the case against Chase are less important to the point I
wish to make than are the consequences of the Senate's decision.
During the impeachment proceedings, many observers viewed the
proceedings against Chase as part of an assault on the entire judicial
branch. Such a conclusion was supported by the fact that the Articles
of Impeachment against Chase were voted by the House on the very
day the Senate convicted in an impeachment trial and removed from
office another Federalist judge, John Pickering of New Hampshire.22
Moreover, Jefferson, upon learning of the presentment of Articles of
Impeachment against Chase, commented: "Now we have caught the
whale, let us have an eye to the shoal."'23 Shortly before the Senate
acquitted Chase, Chief Justice Marshall had proposed privately that
Congress be granted authority to overrule judicial decisions on consti-
tutional questions, a suggestion which one of his biographers attrib-
utes to his extreme fear of the Chase impeachment.2 4
Charles Warren, one of the leading historians of the Supreme
Court, writing half a century ago, summarized his view of the Chase
acquittal: 25
The profound effect produced upon the course of American legal his-
tory by the failure of the Chase impeachment can hardly be overesti-
mated; for it is an undoubted fact that, had the effort been successful,
it was the intention of the Republicans to institute impeachment pro-
19. WARREN, supra note 3. at 282. 293.
20. BERGER, supra note 6.
21. Id. at 229.
22. WARREN, supra note 3. at 295. Numerous complaints about the conduct of
Judge Pickering had been received by President Jefferson. The complaints, which Jef-
ferson forwarded to the House of Representatives, were based chiefly upon allegations
of chronic intoxication and incompetence bordering on insanity. The impeachment pro-
ceedings instituted against Pickering were the first against a member of the federal
judiciary. Most significantly for purposes of the present discussion, the conviction of
Judge Pickering was viewed by many members of Congress as a method of removal
rather than as a conviction for high crimes and misdemeanors. See generally 3 MALONE,
supra note 5. at 460-64.
23. WARREN, supra note 3. at 293.
24. 2 A. BEVERIDGE, LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 177-78 (1916).
25. WARREN, supra note 3. at 292-93.
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ceedings against all the Judges of the Court .... But the mere fact of
an intention to impeach all the Judges was not the most serious feature
of the situation. Its gravest aspect lay in the theory which the Repub-
lican leaders in the House had adopted .... They contended that im-
peachment must be considered a means of keeping the Courts in rea-
sonable harmony with the will of the Nation, as expressed through
Congress and the Executive, and that a judicial decision declaring an
Act of Congress unconstitutional would support an impeachment and
the removal of a Judge, who thus constituted himself an instrument of
opposition to the course of government.
John Quincy Adams, a member of the Senate and a Federalist, made
an entry in his diary at this time setting forth his view of the theory on
which Chase's opponents were proceeding: 26
[The] impeachment was not a criminal prosecution .... And a re-
moval by impeachment was nothing more than a declaration by Con-
gress to this effect: you hold dangerous opinions, and if you are suf-
fered to carry them into effect, you will work the destruction of the
Union. We want your offices for the purpose of giving them to men
who will fill them better.
Although he agrees that the utterances of some of Jefferson's sup-
porters lent color to the claim, Dumas Malone, Jefferson's biographer,
expresses doubt that the Republican leadership intended the Pickering
and Chase impeachments to be the opening phase of a party move
against the entire bench.27
But putting to one side speculation about what the Jeffersonians
would have done had the Senate convicted Chase, the fact remains
that one consequence of a Chase conviction would have been a broad
view of the circumstances under which a judge could be removed by
impeachment. Even Mr. Malone notes:28
The crucial question throughout these [proceedings], and the question
of most enduring interest, was that of the nature and limitation of
impeachment within the constitutional framework. Opinions ranged
from the one most strikingly voiced by Senator Giles at the outset, that
impeachment was a mere political inquest into which the question of
criminality did not enter, to the Federalist contention that no offense
was impeachable if not indictable.
26. Id. at 294.
27. MALONE, supra note 5, at 469-70.
28. Id. at 478.
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I think it fair to say that the Chase acquittal is of critical impor-
tance to the independence of the federal judiciary because it scotched
the broad view of the impeachment power as applied to federal
judges. Perhaps some of the leaders of the impeachment forces were
unwise in basing a portion of their case on so broad a view of the
impeachment power; perhaps Justice Chase could have properly been
convicted upon a narrower view of that authority than expressed by
Senator Giles. But had he been convicted, the conviction would have
surely lent some support to Giles' theory; and conversely the acquittal
limited the use of impeachment by the legislative branch as a means
for removing members of the judiciary. 29
If I am right about the significance of the acquittal of Justice
Chase, that incident in our history is a significant portion of what
might be called the unwritten constitutional law surrounding Article
III. It established generally the proposition that the constitutional lan-
guage conferring tenure on Article III judges "during good behavior"
was to be read with a view to the protection of judicial independence
even at the cost of enduring partisan judges. But the tenure of the in-
dividual judge is not the only point at which the independence of the
judiciary may be assailed. A collegiate court such as the Supreme
Court of the United States was also vulnerable because Article III said
nothing about the number of Associate Justices, in addition to the
Chief Justice, who should compose that Court. A second great polit-
ical battle was fought on that point more than a century after the trial
of Samuel Chase, at the beginning of President Franklin Roosevelt's
second administration.
II. ROOSEVELT'S COURT REORGANIZATION OR
COURT PACKING PLAN
At various times in the first third of this century, "social legislation"
received rough treatment at the hands of the Supreme Court of the
29. A postscript to the Chase impeachment, occurring 5 years after the Senate's ver-
dict. is related in P. CLARKSON & R. JETT, LUTHER MARTIN OF MARYLAND 280 (1970):
In the summer of 1810 [Luther Martin. the principal defense counsel at Chase's
impeachment trial, a heavy drinker, appeared as counsel in Chase's court in Balti-
more] somewhat tighter than usual .... Chase [said to him], "I am surprised that
you can so prostitute your talents." Martin. drawing himself up as straight as he
could, replied to Chase. "Sir. I never prostituted my talents except when I defended
you and Colonel Burr." at which turning to the jury. he added confidentially. "a
842
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United States. In a series of decisions,30 a majority of the Court read
into the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to
the United States Constitution notions of "freedom of contract" and
other principles of laissez-faire individualism, with the result that the
authority of the state and national governments to enact minimum wage
laws was sharply restricted. The authority of Congress to deal with
social and economic problems was further restricted by narrow con-
structions of its authority to legislate under- the commerce clause of
the Constitution.31 Thus matters stood when Franklin Roosevelt was
inaugurated as President in March 1933, during the depths of the
Great Depression. President Roosevelt's "New Deal" followed a prag-
matic philosophy of trying almost any remedy that might cure or ame-
liorate the country's economic woes. But towards the end of his first
term, important pieces of legislation of this sort were held unconstitu-
tional by the Supreme Court.3 2
In the 129 years between Marbury v. Madison and the election of
Franklin Roosevelt, the Supreme Court invalidated only 54 Acts of
Congress, or one every 2 years.33 Between 1934 and 1936, how-
ever, the Court nullified 11 Acts of Congress, including the National
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA),3 4 the Agricultural Adjustment Act,35
the Railway Pension Act,3 6 the Farm Mortgage Moratorium, 37 the
Municipal Bankruptcy Act 38 and the Bituminous Coal Act.39
Following the Court's decision in the so-called "Sick Chicken" case,
couple of the greatest rascals in the world." Chase angrily instructed the clerk to
draw up a citation of Martin for contempt of court, but when it was presented for
his signature, that choleric old man, recollecting their forty-year friendship and all
that he owed Martin, put the quill pen back in its holder saying, 'This hand could
never sign a citation against Luther Martin."
30. See, e.g., Morehead v. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936); Adkins v. Children's Hos-
pital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
31. See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (invalidating federal
statute making it unlawful for railroad to discriminate against employee because of
union membership); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating N.Y.
law limiting bakery working hours).
32. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 1611-12 (1972).
33. Id. at 1597-1611.
34. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
35. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
•36. Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
37. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
38. Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. One, 298 U.S. 513
(1936).
39. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
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Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,40 on May 28, 1935,41 in
which major portions of the NIRA were held unconstitutional, Presi-
dent Roosevelt denounced the Court for taking the country back to "a
horse-and-buggy definition of interstate commerce." 42 Thereafter he
bided his time.
In November 1936, Roosevelt was re-elected to a second term with
a sweeping popular and electoral majority. When the new Congress
convened, it was apparent that the Democrats would have margins of
four to one in the House and five to one in the Senate as a result of
Roosevelt's sweeping electoral triumph.43
Shortly after the election, President Roosevelt and his Attorney
General, Homer Cummings, worked out the details of what they
called the Court Reorganization Plan. The plan was drafted in utmost
secrecy, and many of the President's principal advisers had no knowl-
edge of it until its public disclosure in early February 1937. On the
morning of February 5, 1937, President Roosevelt summoned the
members of his Cabinet and congressional leaders to the White House.
They were provided copies of the bill, a presidential message urging
passage and a short pep talk by the President. 44
The proposal was to grant authority to the President to appoint an
additional Justice of the Supreme Court for each sitting Justice over
the age for pension. Since at that time 6 of the 9 Justices were over the
age of 70,45 if none of them chose to retire, President Roosevelt would
be empowered to expand the membership of the Court to a total of 15
Justices. The President and Attorney General Cummings urged the
plan in the name of judicial efficiency and docket congestion, and
made no effort to face head-on the need or desirability of changing
the philosophy of the Court. 46
40. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
41. The day became known to New Dealers as Black Monday, because on that day
the Court struck down three acts of the New Deal, including a decision which narrowed
the presidential power to remove employees of the executive branch. Humphrey's Exec-
utor (Rathbun) v. United States. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
42. L. BAKER, BACK TO BACK 117 (1967) [hereinafter cited as BAKER].
43. Only 16 of the 96 Senators and 89 of the 435 Congressmen were Republicans.
R. HOFSTADTER, W. MILLER & D. AARON, THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY OF A REPUB-
LiC 674 (1962).
44. Id. at 7.
45. The 6 Justices were Chief Justice Hughes. age 75; and Associate Justices Van
Devanter, age 78; McReynolds. age 75; Brandeis, age 81; Sutherland. age 75; and But-
ler, age 71. 3 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: THEIR
LIVES AND OPINIONS (L. Friedman & F. Israel eds. 1969).
46. See BAKER, supra note 42. at 130-35.
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This approach could not mask the President's real objectives for
long, however, and it ultimately proved to be a serious tactical error.47
Shortly after the President dropped his bombshell, it appeared that he
would succeed in his effort. The heavy Democratic majorities in both
Houses of Congress, many of whom owed their election or re-election
to the immensely popular President, were thought to be in no position
to repudiate his leadership less than a year after he had been trium-
phantly re-elected. Senator Robinson of Arkansas, the Senate Majority
Leader, immediately announced his approval of the plan and predicted
passage. Senator Henry Ashurt of Arizona, the Chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, issued a terse endorsement of the bill. In
the House, Representative Hatton Sumners of Texas, Chairman of the
Judiciary Committee, advised the White House that he could not sup-
port the bill, but agreed to keep his opposition silent for the time
being.48 But even his silent opposition forced the hand of the Adminis-
tration in one respect: it decided to press enactment of the bill first in
the Senate.49
Almost immediately, there was an adverse public reaction to the
bill, and many prominent supporters of the President's re-election the
preceding year refused to support' the proposal.50 Nonetheless, Presi-
dent Roosevelt insisted to his advisers that the people were with him.
The small Republican minorities, at the urging of their leadership,
wisely decided to remain silent about the bill so that Democrats might
feel freer to oppose it. At the same time, Senator Burton K. Wheeler
of Montana, boasting a long record of Democratic progressivism,
became the leader of Senate opposition to the Court plan.51 His lead-
ership of the opposition attracted a wider spectrum of Senate Demo-
crats to the opposition's colors than would have been the case had the
cause been led by a conservative Southern Democrat.
In the weeks after the President's proposal was offered, it became
clear that the Court plan was in for rougher sledding than had been
anticipated when it was first announced. Many of the President's closest
47. Id. at 47.
48. Id. at 65.
49. Id. at 66.
50. A particularly surprising member of the opposition ranks was Democratic lib-
eral Herbert Lehman who wrote to Roosevelt: "I feel that the end which you desire to
attain does not justify the means which you recommend." Id. at 28.
51. Wheeler's opposition had its basis in a political quarrel with Attorney General
Cummings. Id. at 27.
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advisers felt that the arguments being advanced in favor of the bill
were hypocritical. They urged that the President lay his cards on the
table, and admit in a nationwide speech that his purpose was to re-
vamp the judicial philosophy of the Supreme Court. They prevailed.
On March 4, 1937, President Roosevelt told 1,000 Democrats assem-
bled at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington that the legislation was
necessary to prevent the Supreme Court from interpreting the Consti-
tution in such a way as to nullify key parts of the New Deal legislative
program.52 The President's speech, however, never fully dispelled the
general impression that he had not been candid when he first proposed
the plan, and it did nothing to quiet the objections of those who felt
the Court should not be "packed."
Meanwhile, the Senate Judiciary Committee commenced hearings
on the bill on March 10, 1937.53 Homer Cummings, the leadoff wit-
ness in support of the bill, argued that it would promote overall judi-
cial efficiency. 54 Assistant Attorney General Robert H. Jackson, the
next witness, took the direct approach espoused by the President in his
Mayflower Hotel speech. 55
During the two weeks allotted to the Administration to present its
case, leaders of the opposition privately called upon Chief Justice
Hughes to suggest that he and Justice Brandeis appear as witnesses
before the Committee. 56 This suggestion was turned down, but Chief
Justice Hughes, with the consent of other members of the Court,
agreed to write a letter to Senator Wheeler dealing with the "judicial
efficiency" arguments of the bill. In his letter, Chief Justice Hughes
utterly devastated the original arguments advanced for the bill based
on judicial efficiency. He pointed out that the Supreme Court was
then, and had been for a number of years, completely current in its
docket; every case ready for disposition during the Court's term was
52. Id. at 54-56. The speech was one of Roosevelt's most famous and included a
recitation of the New Deal efforts to cure "one third of a nation ill-nourished, ill-clad, ill-
housed-NOW!"
53. The bill, S. 1392, was entitled Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary.
54. Hearings on S. 1392 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess., ser. 25, pt. I, at 4 (1937).
55. Id. at 37. Assistant Attorney General Jackson particularly emphasized federal
judicial interference with federal law and states' rights by declaring legislative enact-
ments unconstitutional.
56. BAKER, supra note 42, at 154.
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in fact disposed of before the Court adjourned in the early sum-
mer.57 He went on to state:58
An increase in the number of Justices of the Supreme Court, apart
from any question of policy, which I do not discuss, would not
promote the efficiency of the Court. There would be more judges to
hear, more judges to confer, more judges to discuss, more judges to be
convinced and to decide.
Hughes' letter was a masterpiece of the lawyer's art, singling out the
arguments originally advanced for the bill and demolishing them with
unerring accuracy. 59 Had the Court plan been frankly advanced as a
method by which the judicial philosophy of the Court could be
changed, the propriety of the Chief Justice responding to it would
have been questionable, and the arguments to be made against it nec-
essarily more debatable and more apparently self-interested. But the
original argument had been couched in terms of judicial management
and procedural problems, and Chief Justice Hughes' letter left this
argument in shreds upon the floor of the Hearing Room of the Senate
Judiciary Committee.
The rest of this political battle may be shortly told. While the Court
plan was pending in the Senate, the Supreme Court turned sharply
away from some of the older precedents dealing with due process and
commerce, and, in a series of decisions, 60 indicated a more hospitable
attitude towards social legislation. In one of the cases,61 the difference
in result was later traced to Justice Owen Roberts whose newfound
adherence to limited judicial review was described by a contempora-
neous commentator as the theory that "a switch in time serves nine."'62
57. See id. 154-63.
58. Id. at 158.
59. Justice Jackson, again writing before his appointment to the bench, noted that
"[t) he Supreme Court has, from the very nature of its functions, been deep in power pol-
itics from the opening of the Court, and some of its leadership has been superb, notably
so under Marshall and Hughes." JACKSON, supra note 2, at viii. This passage was ob-
viously penned by one who had felt the sting of Chief Justice Hughes in the fight over the
Court plan; Jackson was an Assistant Attorney General at the time and testified in favor
of the plan. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
60. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Townsend v.
Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441 (1937).
61. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
62. The remark is attributed to a young New Deal attorney named Abe Fortas.
N.Y. Times, June 15, 1937, at p. 19, col. 8.
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In May 1937, Justice Van Devanter announced his intention to re-
tire at the close of the Court term. Thus, the President, who was al-
ready prevailing on some of the constitutional issues which concerned
him, would also have the opportunity to fill a vacancy in a matter of
months. Even to some of the supporters of the Court plan, much of
the reason behind it seemed to have disappeared. The Senate ulti-
mately voted overwhelmingly to recommit the bill to the Judiciary
Committee with instructions to drop all provisions relating to the Su-
preme Court,63 and the battle thus ended during the summer of 1937.
When President Roosevelt originally proposed his Court plan, he
stated in the accompanying message that the size of the Supreme
Court had been changed repeatedly during its history. He was quite
right, but the other changes in size were, with one exception, 64 de-
signed to keep the Court apace with an expanding nation which re-
quired the Justices of the Supreme Court to ride circuit as well as per-
form their appellate duties. The Roosevelt plan was different not
merely in degree, but in kind, from other changes which had been
legislated in the size of the Court. Had it been enacted, the plan would
have been an important milestone on the road to approval of the de-
vice of legislatively enlarging the Court's membership in order to
change its view of the Constitution. The defeat of the Court Packing
Plan represents another important event in the development of the
unwritten constitutional law surrounding Article III. The defeat of the
Chase impeachment tended to preserve the independence of the indi-
vidual judge or Justice; the defeat of the Court plan tended to pre-
serve the independence of the Court as an institution.
III. CONCLUSION
There are striking similarities between these two political battles,
even though they were separated in time by more than 130 years.
Each was begun by a tremendously popular Chief Executive whose
party was in control of Congress and who felt that the judicial branch
either was presently, or would eventually, frustrate the party's pro-
gram. Had the dominant party in Congress been able to hold its own
63. BAKER, supra note 42. at 271.
64. In 1862 the Court had 10 members. With the deaths of Chief Justice Taney
(1864) and Justice Wayne (1867) the number was reduced to eight. Congress then in-
creased the number to nine in the Judiciary Act of 1869, 16 Stat. 44 (1869). See gener-
ally 6 C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (197 1).
848
Vol. 50: 835, 1975
Judicial Independence
members in line, each proposal would have succeeded. In each case
the proposed action failed because the ranks of the dominant party
broke, some members evidently feeling that the claims of judicial in-
dependence were more important than those of party loyalty.
In my opinion, both these precedents in the unwritten law of Article
III are sound, a view which I believe is shared by most thoughtful
observers of the constitutional scene.65 Even judges who perform
badly, as Justice Chase did, should not be removed by impeachment
simply because their judicial actions are out of keeping with the domi-
nant political views in the nation. Nor should the size of the nation's
highest Court be manipulated because the views of that Court are out
of step with the dominant view in the nation.
I would like to add, however, that nothing in the teaching of either
the events of 1805 or those of 1937 suggests that the Supreme Court
of the United States, or the judicial branch of the federal government
generally, should be hermetically sealed from trends of national
opinion. Just because such currents of national opinion do not prop-
erly afford a basis for removal of a sitting judge, or arbitrary expan-
sion of the membership of a constitutional court, does not mean that
those who are vested by the Constitution with responsibility for the
selection of federal judges--the President, by his authority to appoint,
and the Senate, by its responsibility to confirm-are not entitled to
consider such factors. No doubt most Presidents whom historians re-
gard as "strong" Presidents considered what political, social and legal
philosophy their Supreme Court nominees would follow after donning
their judicial robes. The fact that Presidents have frequently been dis-
appointed in their expectations does not detract from the fact that
they properly considered the matter.
The role played by the Senate over the years has been a more
varying one, depending on a multitude of factors. Not the least of
these factors is the inevitable diversity, in a body consisting of 100
members, as to the standards which should be applied by the Senate in
determining whether to confirm a Presidential nominee for judicial
office. Senate debates in connection with the* most recent nominees to
the Supreme Court suggest that there is a substantial body of opinion
65. See, e.g., 3 A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 185 (1916). Berger con-
cedes that "it has long been the accepted opinion that the acquittal of Justice Samuel
Chase represents the triumph of justice over heated political partisanship." BERGER,
supra note 6, at 224.
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that Senators, as well as the President, may inquire into the judicial
philosophy of the nominees. Indeed, articulate statements of this view
were made in connection with the Senate debates during the confirma-
tion of President Hoover's nomination of Judge John J. Parker to be
an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. An
editorial, appearing in the New York World, opposed to Parker's con-
firmation, stated: 66
The Senate has every right, if it so chooses, to ask the President to
maintain on the Supreme Court bench a balance between liberal and
conservative opinion in the country as a whole, and every right on this
premise to object that the presence of Judge Parker on the bench
would increase, rather than lessen, the topheavily conservative bias of
the Supreme Court as now constituted.
Judge Parker's confirmation was successfully opposed by most lib-
erals in the Senate, as well as organized labor and the NAACP.67 In-
terestingly enough, for those who are inclined to think that the holders
of elective office are always unable to rise above principle, the opposi-
tion to Judge Parker's confirmation in the Senate was led by Senator
William E. Borah of Idaho, who felt that Parker's appointment to the
Supreme Court would reinforce what he considered the propensity of
the Court to read into\the Constitution its own economic view. But
only seven years later, when President Roosevelt was urging his Court
plan as a method for changing the Court's judicial philosophy, Sen-
ator Borah strongly opposed that measure.
During the debates on Parker's confirmation, Senator Borah made
some observations with which I find it very difficult to disagree:68
[The Supreme Court of the United States passes] upon what we do.
Therefore, it is exceedingly important that we pass upon them before
they decide upon these matters. I say this in great sincerity. We declare
national policy. They reject it. I feel I am well justified in inquiring of
men on their way to the Supreme Bench something of their views on
these questions.
At a later point in the debate, Borah stated:69
66. New York World. April 23. 1930.
67. Rehnquist. The Making of a Supreme Court Justice. 29 HARV. L. RECORD 7. 8
(1959).
68. 72 CONG. REC. 7932 (1930) (remarks of Senator Borah).
69. Id. at 7939.
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Upon some judicial tribunals it is enough, perhaps, that there be men
of integrity and of great learning in the law, but upon this tribunal
[the Supreme Court] something more is needed, something more is
called for, here the widest and broadest and deepest questions of gov-
ernment and governmental policies are involved.
It seems to me that Senator Borah was right, from his point of
view, in taking the position he did as to the confirmation of Judge
Parker, even though hindsight and observation of Judge Parker's sub-
sequent distinquished career as Chief Judge of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has suggested that he would
not, if confirmed, have acted as his opponents thought he would. I be-
lieve Senator Borah was also right in opposing President Roosevelt's
Court plan. He recognized that the normal responsiveness of the ap-
pointing and confirming authorities to tides of public opinion, as well
as other factors, inevitably suggests that those who are, in the words of
Senator' Borah, "on their way to the Supreme Court," may be judged
by broader standards than merely moral rectitude and legal learning.
But he likewise saw how different this sort of responsiveness was
from the enactment of legislation which would have arbitrarily en-
larged the membership of the Supreme Court simply to revamp its ju-
dicial philosophy.
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